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The paper analyzes to what degree violations of the perfect validity of the exclusion restriction for family 
background variables in income regression affect the estimation results.  
In case of moderate direct effects of the instrument on the dependent variable, the results do not deviate 
much from the benchmark case of no such effect (perfect validity of the instrument’s exclusion restriction).  
The finding provides confidence in the use of family background variables as instruments in income regres-
sions. 
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1. Introduction 
Education is a well-known determinant of income. However, the measurement of its influence 
suffers from endogeneity suspicion (Dickson and Harmon 2011; Griliches and Mason 1972, Black-
burn and Neumark 1993, Webbink 2005). Instrumental variables (IV) regression is believed to yield 
an appropriate estimator in the presence of endogeneity (Angrist and Krueger 1991, Angrist et al. 
1996, Card 2001). The difficulty arises in regard to finding an instrument that is strongly correlated 
with the endogenous variable and that satisfies the exclusion restriction (i.e., having no direct effect 
on income). In many studies, family background variables have been used as instruments for educa-
tion (Blackburn and Neumark 1993, 1995, Parker and van Praag 2006). Compared with other in-
struments, family background variables have an advantage in that they are available in many data-
sets and that they are usually strongly correlated with the endogenous variable. Thus, the use of 
family background variables allows scholars to avoid a weak instruments problem (Bound et al. 
1995). Recently, however, the use of family background variables, such as parents‘ or spouse‘s 
education levels, has been criticized (Trostel et al. 2002, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) be-
cause these variables do not meet the strict validity assumption that is required for IV regressions. 
Because family background variables are believed to have a direct effect on the respondent‘s in-
come level, they cannot be used as an instrument for education. For example, it can be argued that 
family background variables are correlated with family wealth, which then may have a direct influ-
ence on the respondent‘s individual income. It may also be argued that family background variables 
are correlated with the preference for finding a job in a particular firm or industry. This preference 
may have a direct influence on the respondent‘s income. 
This paper investigates the use of family background variables as instruments for education in 
detail. Using data from the 2004 German Socio-Economic Panel and Bayesian analysis, we analyze 
to what degree violations of the validity of family background variables as instruments have an ef-
fect on the estimation results of the IV model. Our research strategy is to begin with a tight prior 
around zero for the instrument‘s direct effect on the dependent variable, and subsequently to con-
sider priors that allow for an increasing direct effect. As expected, our results demonstrate that if the 
instrument is assumed to have a sizeable direct effect of the instrument on the dependent variable, 
the coefficient of the IV model changes compared with the benchmark case where no direct effect 
of the instrument exists. For example, if the direct effect of the instrument (the father‘s education) 
on income, which works in addition to the instrument‘s indirect effect via own education (taking 
into account the effect of control variables), is 50% of the effect of a respondent‘s own education on 
income, then the estimated effect of an individual‘s own education on income decreases from 
β=0.079 to β=0.044. Indeed, the use of family background variables can lead to biased estimates. 
However, and more importantly, in many cases, the bias from using family background variables as 
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instruments is lower than the width of the 95% posterior interval of the coefficient of the instru-
mented variable. Therefore, depending on the precision required of the estimated return to educa-
tion – in terms of sign or level – and the strength of the assumed indirect effect, using family back-
ground variables is a viable option. In any case, the bias from using family background variables 
should be compared with the problems generated by alternative instrumentation strategies such as 
educational reforms (e.g., Oosterbeck and Webbink, 2007), which are rarely available. Across-the-
board criticism of family background variables as instruments does not appear to be justified. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our Bayesian ap-
proach. Section 3 shows our econometric model. Section 4 introduces our dataset and variables. 
Section 5 shows our results, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Method 
2.1 The Bayesian approach 
We use Bayesian methods to estimate the IV model. Bayesian analysis of IV models has be-
come increasingly popular over the last several years.
1
 Bayesian methods rely on Bayes‘ theorem of 
probability theory (Bayes 1763). This theorem is given by 
 
)(
)()|(
)|(
yp
pyp
yp

  ,        (1) 
 
where   represents the set of unknown parameters, and y  represents the data. )(p is the prior 
density of the parameter, which may be derived from theoretical or other a priori knowledge. 
)|( yp  is the likelihood function, which is the density (or probability in the case of discrete events) 
of the data y given the unknown parameter  . )(yp  is the marginal likelihood, the marginal density 
of the data y, and finally, )|( yp   represents the posterior density which is the density of the para-
meter   given the data y. In Bayesian analysis, inference comes from the posterior distribution 
which states the likelihood of a particular parameter value. To determine the relationship between 
two variables, Bayesian analysis proceeds as follows. First, a priori beliefs about the relationship of 
interest are formulated (the prior distribution, )(p ). Next, a probability of occurrence for the data 
given certain parameter values is assumed (the likelihood function, )|( yp ). Third, data are used 
                                                 
1  See Kleibergen and Zivot (2003) and Lancaster (2005) for an overview of Bayesian analysis of IV models and a comparison 
with classical IV regression. 
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 3 
to update these beliefs. The result is the posterior density, )|( yp  . It allows for statements in terms 
of likely and unlikely parameter values. We compute and analyze the means, standard deviations, 
and percentiles of the respective parameter distributions. These posterior properties are computed as 
the sample statistics of a large set of draws from the posterior distribution, which are obtained using 
Gibbs sampling. 
2.2 Bayesian analysis in the instrumental variables model 
An instrument makes sense if it satisfies the exclusion restriction and is strongly correlated 
with the endogenous explanatory variable. Bayesian analysis can be used to get reliable estimation 
results, when a researcher doubts whether the instrument satisfies these requirements. 
Exclusion restriction of the instrument: In principle, an instrument should not be correlated 
with the error term. That is, the instrument should not have a direct effect on the dependent variable; 
it should only affect the dependent variable via the endogenous explanatory variable.
2
 Bayesian 
analysis can be used to analyze the outcome if this crucial assumption is violated. Through Baye-
sian analysis, it is possible to incorporate a prior distribution for the instrument‘s direct effect on the 
dependent variable. In many situations, researchers believe that there is a direct effect that is ap-
proximately zero rather than one that is exactly zero. By beginning with a tight prior around zero 
and subsequently considering priors that allow for an increasing direct effect, one can analyze the 
robustness of the results with respect to the validity assumption. 
Strength of the instrument: an instrument should be correlated with the endogenous explanato-
ry variable. Preferably, the instrument should have a strong effect on the endogenous explanatory 
variable. Otherwise, one is faced with the issue of weak instruments, which may make it difficult to 
draw meaningful conclusions. Prior research has used Bayesian methods to generate reliable and 
accurate estimation results when weak instruments were used (Hoogerheide et al. 2007a, 2007b). 
However, as expected, our family background variable (having a correlation of 0.38 with education, 
p<0.001) certainly does not constitute a weak instrument. Therefore, our only concerns regarding 
the instrument concern the validity of the strict exclusion restriction.  
3. Econometric model 
We estimate the effect of education on income, expressed in the following equation: 
 
                                                 
2  In the classical approach, one can perform the Sargan test on the validity of instruments (Kennedy 2008, pp. 154-156), if one has 
more instruments than endogenous explanatory variables. But this has no power (i.e., power is equal to size) against cases in 
which the instruments‘ direct effects on the dependent variable are proportional to their effects on the endogenous explanatory 
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where income is the dependent variable, education is our explanatory variable of interest, wi are the 
exogenous variables, 1 is a constant, and u1 is an error term with E(u1)=0. However, the variable 
education is assumed to be endogenous, i.e. the variable is correlated with the error term u1. IV re-
gression is considered to be an appropriate estimator in the presence of endogeneity (Angrist et al. 
1996; Card 2001). The basic idea is to find an instrument that is uncorrelated with the errors u1 in 
the model but that is correlated with the endogenous variable education. In our case, this idea leads 
to the following equation: 
 
2
1
22 uwzeducation
m
i
ii  

      (3) 
 
where education is the endogenous variable, z refers to the instrument used (the father‘s education), 
 measures the strength of the relationship between the instrument and the endogenous variable, 2 
is a constant, and u2 is an error term. The idea of the IV approach is to estimate both equations si-
multaneously. However, for this approach to work and to produce meaningful estimates, two condi-
tions need to be satisfied: (1) cov(z, u1) = 0 (i.e., the instrument should not be correlated with the 
error term of the performance equation), and (2)   0 (i.e., there should be a non-zero relationship 
between the instrument and the endogenous explanatory variable). The first condition refers to the 
validity of the instrument, whereas the second condition refers to the strength of the instrument. 
To estimate the bias when using family background variables as instruments, we assume that 
there is a (small) direct effect γ of the instrument on income, which works in addition to the instru-
ment‘s indirect effect via own education (and taking into account the effects of the control va-
riables). Then equation (2) is rewritten as follows: 
 
 

m
i
ii uwzeducationincome
1
111     (4) 
 
Define  /~   as the ratio of the effects of the instrument and the respondent‘s education on 
income. We consider the posterior results for various values of ~ , iteratively simulating from the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
variable (a common situation). The data simply contain no information as to whether this particular violation is present or not, so 
a priori assumptions about this aspect are crucial for estimation results. 
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 5 
conditional posterior distributions by the Gibbs sampling method of Conley et al. (2012). We con-
sider ~  rather than   because it is easier to specify prior ideas about the relative effect of father‘s 
education vis-à-vis the effect of own education than to specify ideas about the absolute effect of the 
father‘s education. Appendix 1 summarizes our approach in a technical way. 
With respect to the validity of the exclusion restriction, it is useful to consider two extreme 
cases. First, the model (2) can be considered an ‗extreme‘ case of model (3) with 0 , where the 
father‘s education has not direct effect on income. A second extreme case is the situation, where 
OLS ˆ , the OLS estimator in the model that results if we delete the explanatory variable educa-
tion from (3). For OLS ˆ , the posterior of   will be centered on 0, as the whole effect of one‘s 
father‘s education on one‘s income will be considered a direct effect such that the indirect effect of 
the father‘s education via one‘s own education will be 0. In other words, if  approaches 0, the 
posterior mode of   will be close to TSLSˆ , the two-stage least squares estimator of  . However, 
if  approaches OLSˆ , the posterior mode of   approaches 0. 
We assume that   has a ‗moderate‘ value ( OLS ˆ ) for three reasons. First, one would ex-
pect one‘s own education to be more important than one‘s father‘s education. A direct effect of 
one‘s father‘s education on one‘s income may stem from various factors such as access to networks 
and connections, family wealth, and work values. However, if one‘s father‘s education affects these 
circumstances and attitudes, then it is implausible that one‘s own education would have no (or a 
smaller) effect. In other words, if education has a causal effect on earnings, then it is implausible 
that an additional year of education will benefit one‘s son or daughter, but not (or to a lesser extent) 
oneself. Second, using data from Chile, Patrinos and Sakellariou (2011) also consider a different 
instrument based on the introduction of a nationwide school choice system in 1981. These research-
ers estimate the direct effect   of the father‘s education on income as merely 0.010, and  /~   
as approximately 0.18. Third, evidence for a significantly positive   is found in multiple studies 
involving different instruments than family background variables. In the seminal paper by Angrist 
and Krueger (1991), instrumental variables based on quarter-of-birth dummies are used for multiple 
cohorts and for several model specifications (including a diverse number of control variables). For 
each cohort and model, a significantly positive estimate of TSLSˆ  is found. 
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4. Data and Variables 
4.1 Data 
Our estimations are based on a data set that is made available by the German Socio-Economic 
Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
3
 The SOEP is 
an annually conducted longitudinal household survey that provides amongst others detailed infor-
mation about, for example, the participant‘s occupational status (e.g., employee or self-employed). 
To construct our estimation sample, we selected the year 2004 and those persons who are either 
self-employed or employed. After excluding observations with missing values, we obtained a data 
set containing 8,244 observations. 
4.2 Variables 
Income is measured as the natural logarithm of hourly wage, which is determined by dividing 
the annual gross income (in €) by the annual number of hours worked. The endogenous explanatory 
variable education is measured as the number of years of schooling. The instrument used in the 
education equation is the number of years of the father‘s secondary education. As the control va-
riables, we included the respondent‘s labor market experience (in its linear and squared terms), 
gender, wealth (as proxied by the respondent‘s income from assets), marriage status, nationality, 
duration of unemployment before employment, whether the respondent lives in the former West-
Germany, whether the respondent is self-employed, and industry dummies. For more details regard-
ing the construction of the variables, see Table A1 of Appendix 2. 
5. Results and Discussion 
If we assume a perfectly valid instrument, that satisfies the exclusion restriction (i.e. ~ =0), 
then the posterior density of   is given by Figure 1. The posterior mean is 0.079; the 2.5% and 
97.5% posterior percentiles are 0.066 and 0.092, respectively. Table A2 of Appendix 2 lists the de-
tailed estimation results for all of the variables included in the instrumental variables regression. 
That is, an extra year of education leads on average to a 7.9% increase of the hourly wage. 
 
                                                 
3  For more information about the SOEP, we refer to Wagner et al. (1993, 2007). 
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Figure 1: The posterior density )|( datap   of  , the effect of (years of) education on the 
logarithm of income, when perfect validity of the instrument is assumed 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of choosing various values of ~  on the estimated posterior dis-
tribution of  . The vertical line at ~ =0 corresponds to the results illustrated in Figure 1. Table A3 
in Appendix 2 gives a full account of the estimated posterior distribution of  . 
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Figure 2: The mean and the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the posterior distribution of  , 
the effect of (years of) education on the logarithm of income, for different values of ~ , the ra-
tio of the effect of the father’s education on the logarithm of income to the effect of own edu-
cation on the logarithm of income. 
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Notice that the posterior results do not change substantially if we choose plausible, small posi-
tive values of ~ . For example, consider ~ =0.35, which assumes that the effect of an extra year of 
the father‘s (secondary) education is 35% of the effect of an extra year of an individual‘s own edu-
cation on income. For ~ =0.35, the 2.5% posterior percentile of β is 0.042, which is 0.024 lower 
than the 2.5% percentile for ~ =0. This difference of 0.024 is smaller than the 0.026 width of the 
95% interval for ~ =0. In other words, incorporating the uncertainty regarding the validity of the 
instrument leads to an increase in the posterior uncertainty of   that is no larger than the uncertain-
ty that we face in the case of a perfectly valid instrument. 
For increasingly positive values of ~ , the posterior of   moves to 0; an increasingly large 
part of the total effect of the father‘s education on income is considered as a direct effect on income, 
rather than as an indirect effect via own education. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The mean and the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the posterior distribution of  , 
the effect of (years of) education on the logarithm of income, for different values of ~ , the ra-
tio of the effect of the father’s education on the logarithm of income to the effect of own edu-
cation on the logarithm of income. 
 
 
However, large values of ~  can be considered implausible. It is plausible that an individual‘s 
own education is more important than the father‘s education. 
In addition, negative values of ~  are implausible because one may expect the effects of the 
father‘s education and one‘s own education to have the same (typically positive) sign. For increa-
singly negative values of ~ , the posterior of   moves away from 0. In these (implausible) cases, 
one assumes that the effect of own education is particularly large because it ‗compensates‘ for the 
negative effect of the father‘s education. The total effect of the father‘s education is then split into a 
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negative direct effect and a more positive indirect effect via own education than in the case of a 
strictly valid instrument. Therefore, this assumption of ~ <0 would only make the estimated effect 
of own education on income stronger. 
To assess the effect of incorrectly specifying the relation between family background and 
education, we have considered the following simulation experiment. We simulated 1,000 data sets 
for which expected education is a non-linear (convex or concave) function of family background, 
and estimated the linear IV model. As a result, the 95% posterior interval for   became somewhat 
wider, but this 95% posterior interval for   still contains the true value of   for 95% of the simu-
lated data sets. Moreover, the posterior mean remained an (at least approximately) unbiased estima-
tor of  . Therefore, this type of misspecification is ‘not dangerous’ in the sense that it does not 
lead to a wrongly located, biased posterior of  . It may only be more efficient, in the sense that it 
leads to a more precise estimator of   (i.e. a smaller posterior standard deviation) by considering a 
different functional form for the effect of father‘s education on own education. This issue has been 
left as a topic for further research. Here, we mention only that adding the square of the father‘s edu-
cation to the education equation (3) causes only minor changes, as compared with the linear IV 
model. 
We now discuss the possible effects that some other types of specification errors may have. 
First, omitted variables in the income equation may cause endogeneity. The use of the IV model 
implies that this possibility has already been taken into account. Second, non-normality and hete-
roskedasticity can seriously affect the estimation results for weak instruments; see Hoogerheide, 
Opschoor and Van Dijk (2011). However, our instrument is very strong; father‘s education has a 
substantial and significant effect on own education. Third, we did not find significant evidence for 
the presence of a non-linear (quadratic) effect of education on (the logarithm of) income. The analy-
sis of different functional forms for the income equation has been left as a topic for further research. 
The framework of this paper used to evaluate the use of family background variables as in-
struments in income regressions can be extended easily to the case of a heterogeneous return to 
education. In this case, one can choose between two alternatives. One can specify a constant ratio ~  
of the direct effect of father‘s education to the effect of one‘s own education, while these effects 
both vary across individuals. Alternatively, one can specify different ratios ~  for different groups 
of individuals. 
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6. Conclusions 
Our results imply that the across-the-board criticism of family background variables as in-
struments is unjustified. Most researchers are very critical about the use of family background va-
riables as instruments because these variables may have a direct effect on the respondent‘s income 
level, violating the exclusion restriction. Our Bayesian analysis investigates the severity of this 
problem. We find that relaxing the strict exclusion restriction on the family background instruments 
does lead to different results. However, the size of the bias is often smaller than the width of the 
95% posterior interval of the education coefficient in the IV model. The results remain qualitatively 
similar even when the validity of the instrument would be substantially violated compared with the 
benchmark case where the instrument is assumed to be strictly exogenous. In conclusion, depending 
on the precision required of the estimated return on education, using the father‘s education as an 
instrument in an income regression is a viable option for solving the endogeneity problem with re-
gard to education. 
It is unclear how generalizable our findings are for other family background variables, such as 
the mother‘s or the spouse‘s education and the parent‘s social class or profession (Block et al. in 
press). As a general guideline to judge the suitability of a family background variable as an instru-
ment, we propose the following two steps. First, one should perform a Bayesian analysis under the 
assumption that the exclusion restriction is exactly satisfied. If this analysis results in a 95% post-
erior interval for the coefficient of interest that is too wide for any practical purposes, then the in-
struments are apparently too weak for any useful inference to be drawn. If not, then in the second 
step, one should consider the priors that allow for an increasing direct effect of the instrument, to 
assess whether the potential bias is so large that the estimation results become unusable for one‘s 
particular research problem. Future research in this area could analyze the suitability of other family 
background variables as instruments. Other than using other family background variables as instru-
ments, it would also be fruitful to learn more about the use of family background variables in other 
areas of education or labor market research, such as occupational choice decisions (Block et al. in 
press; Evans and Jovanovic 1989) or the determinants of job satisfaction (Fabra and Camisón 2009). 
Our findings have practical implications for the empirical research in labor and education 
economics. Unlike other instruments, such as quarter of birth in combination with differences 
among schooling laws (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Deaton 2009; see Webbink 2005 for a survey), 
family background variables are available in many household surveys, including the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and the US panel study of 
income dynamics (PSID). Household surveys such as the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) enable cross-country IV regressions. Cross-country research about the economic effects of 
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educational attainment (Ashenfelter et al. 1999; Behrman 1978; Brunello and Comi 2004; Flabbi et 
al. 2008; García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez 2005) is facilitated. Furthermore, family back-
ground variables are usually highly correlated with the respondent‘s level of education. Hence, the 
issue of having a (statistically) weak (Bound et al. 1995; Dickson and Harmon 2011) or (economi-
cally) irrelevant instrument (Deaton 2009) can be avoided. 
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Appendix 1: Bayesian analysis of an instrumental variables model  
 
We write our model as: 
 
jjjjj uwzxy 11'      (j=1,…,n)  (A1) 
jx                  jj uz 22'
~    (j=1,…,n)  (A2) 
 
where  jy  log(income) of individual j; 
jx  education of individual j ; 
jw control variables for individual j (including a constant term); 
ju1 , ju2  = error term for individual j ; 
jz
~  instruments (including education jz  of individual j‘s father and control variables jw ). 
 
 
The error terms ),( 21 jj uu  are independently and normally distributed ),0(~)',( 21 ujj Nuu   with 
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We have  ~  such that (A1) is 
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We specify a flat prior  for 21, :  1),( 21 p ; for   an uninformative, proper normal prior   
~ ),( 2,, priorpriorN   ; for
1 uu  an uninformative limit case of the Wishart distribution: 
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The likelihood is: 
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The posterior density kernel is: 
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We will use the notation   to denote the set of all parameters in   except for  . We apply the 
Gibbs sampler (Geman and Geman (1984)) to simulate the draws from the posterior distribution, 
iteratively sampling from the full conditional posteriors: 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A1: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
  
 Categorical variables 
  
Male Dummy for an individual who is male 
 
Non-German Dummy for an individual who is Non-German by nationality 
 
Married Dummy for an individual who is married 
 
West Germany Dummy for an individual who lives in West Germany 
 
Industry dummies Dummies for the following industries: agriculture (NACE 1,2, and 5); 
manufacturing (NACE 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 96, 97, and 100); retail (NACE 
51 and 52); hotel and restaurant (NACE 55); financial services (NACE 65, 
66, 67, and 70); firm services (NACE 50, 72, and 74); construction 
(NACE 45); health (NACE 85); transportation (NACE 60, 61, 62, and 63); 
culture, sports, and leisure (NACE 92); and other (NACE 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 64, 71, 73, 75, 80, 90, 91, 93, 95, 98, and 99) 
 
Self-employed Dummy for an individual who is self-employed 
  
 Continuous variables and ordinal variable 
  
Income Log (annual gross income [in €] divided by annual hours worked [in hrs.]) 
 
Education Years of schooling (including time at university) 
 
Education of respondent‘s father Years of education required to reach the father‘s secondary school certifi-
cate: 9 years for ―Hauptschule‖, 10 years for ―Realschule‖, 12 years for 
―Fachhochschulreife‖, 13 years for ―Abitur‖. 
 
Experience Current age minus age at first job 
 
Unemployment duration Number of months that an individual has been unemployed in his or her 
entire working life before entering self-employment 
 
Wealth Log (household income from assets) 
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Table A2: Posterior results of the instrumental variables model for a perfectly valid instru-
ment 
Dependent variable: income (=log hourly wage) 
 
 
Mean and standard 
dev. of posterior 
distribution Percentiles of posterior distribution 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 2.5% 97.5% 25% 75% 
       
Education (instrumented) 
1
 0.079 0.007 0.066 0.092 0.075 0.084 
Experience 0.034 0.002 0.031 0.038 0.033 0.035 
Experience²/10 -0.006 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
Unemployment duration -0.049 0.006 -0.060 -0.038 -0.053 -0.045 
Male 0.138 0.013 0.113 0.163 0.130 0.147 
Married 0.051 0.012 0.028 0.076 0.043 0.059 
Non-German 0.033 0.033 -0.032 0.097 0.011 0.055 
Wealth 0.029 0.003 0.022 0.035 0.026 0.031 
West Germany 0.328 0.013 0.302 0.354 0.319 0.337 
Agriculture 
2
 -0.393 0.049 -0.490 -0.299 -0.426 -0.360 
Manufacturing 
2
 0.076 0.019 0.039 0.113 0.063 0.088 
Retail 
2
 -0.104 0.025 -0.153 -0.056 -0.120 -0.087 
Hotel and Restaurant 
2
 -0.246 0.045 -0.332 -0.159 -0.276 -0.216 
Financial Services 
2
 0.164 0.025 0.117 0.213 0.148 0.181 
Firm Services 
2
 -0.014 0.021 -0.055 0.026 -0.028 0.000 
Construction 
2
 -0.051 0.030 -0.110 0.009 -0.072 -0.030 
Health 
2
 0.043 0.020 0.004 0.081 0.030 0.056 
Transportation 
2
 -0.012 0.034 -0.078 0.053 -0.035 0.011 
Culture, Sports, and Leisure 
2
 -0.068 0.044 -0.154 0.019 -0.098 -0.039 
Self-employed 0.001 0.019 -0.036 0.038 -0.011 0.014 
       
 
Notes: N = 8,244 observations; data source: GSOEP 
The posterior moments and percentiles are estimated on the basis of 10,000 simulated draws, that are generated using 
the Gibbs sampling method (using the pseudo-random number generators in Matlab
TM 
) after a burn-in of 1000 dis-
carded draws. A non-informative proper prior is specified for β, a standard normal distribution N(0,1). Non-informative 
improper priors are specified for the other parameters. The results are robust with respect to considerable deviations in 
the non-informative prior specification. 
1
 Instrument used: education of respondent’s father 
2 
Reference category: industry category other. 
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Table A3: Posterior distribution of β, the effect of education (years) on the logarithm of in-
come, for different values of  /~   
 
 Mean and standard dev. of 
the posterior distribution of β 
Percentiles of the posterior  
distribution of β 
~  Mean Std. Dev. 2.5% 97.5% 
-0.40 0.232 0.044 0.145 0.319 
-0.30 0.157 0.019 0.113 0.194 
-0.20 0.118 0.011 0.096 0.140 
-0.10 0.095 0.008 0.079 0.111 
0 0.079 0.007 0.066 0.092 
0.05 0.073 0.006 0.061 0.085 
0.10 0.068 0.006 0.057 0.079 
0.15 0.064 0.005 0.053 0.074 
0.20 0.060 0.005 0.050 0.070 
0.25 0.056 0.005 0.047 0.066 
0.30 0.053 0.005 0.044 0.062 
0.35 0.050 0.004 0.042 0.059 
0.40 0.048 0.004 0.039 0.056 
0.45 0.046 0.004 0.038 0.054 
0.50 0.044 0.004 0.036 0.051 
0.60 0.040 0.004 0.033 0.047 
0.70 0.037 0.004 0.030 0.044 
0.80 0.034 0.003 0.028 0.041 
0.90 0.032 0.003 0.026 0.038 
1 0.030 0.003 0.024 0.036 
2 0.019 0.002 0.015 0.022 
3 0.013 0.002 0.011 0.016 
4 0.010 0.001 0.008 0.013 
5 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.011 
10 0.005 0.0005 0.004 0.006 
25 0.002 0.0002 0.001 0.002 
100 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 
1000 0.00005 0.00001 0.00004 0.00006 
 
Notes: ~  = the ratio of γ, the direct effect of the father‘s education on the logarithm of income, to β, the effect of one‘s 
own education on the logarithm of income. 
 
The posterior moments and percentiles are estimated on the basis of 10,000 simulated draws that are generated using the 
Gibbs sampling method after a burn-in of 1000 discarded draws.  A non-informative proper prior is specified for β, a 
standard normal distribution N(0,1). Non-informative improper priors are specified for the other parameters. The results 
are robust with respect to considerable deviations in the non-informative prior specification. The control variables are 
the explanatory variables given in Table A2, with the exception of education and the inclusion of a constant term. 
 
